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This paper addresses the phenomenon of event composition : the derivation of a 
single event description expressed in one clause from two lexical heads which could 
have been used in the description of independent events, each expressed in a distinct 
clause. In English, this phenomenon is well attested with respect to sentences whose 
verb is found in combination with an XP describing a result not strictly lexical ly 
entailed by this verb, as in ( 1 ) . 
( 1 )  The joggers ran the pavement thin .  
This sentence makes reference to a complex event encompassing an event of run­
ning and an event of becoming thin.  The lexical heads run and thin appear in a 
single clause, with the AP appearing as closely bound to the verb in the syntax 
as subcategorized complements (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1 995 ; Tenny 1 994; 
Roberts 1 988),  justifying the assumption that a single event is made reference to 
by this sentence. We consider ( 1 )  to be an instance of event composition since its 
verb, run, on its own does not entail a particular result state, and certainly not a 
result state that does not involve the runner. Furthermore, the components of the 
event described in this example could have been expressed in separate clauses, as in 
The joggers ran and they caused the pavement to become thin or as in The joggers 
caused the pavement to become thin by running. 
We address two major questions concerning event composition. I The first 
is: What relation must hold between two events in order for the event structures 
representing them to be able to be composed into one event structure expressible 
in a single clause? The second is: What is  the nature of the event structures of 
compositionally derived events? 
It has been claimed that only causally related events can be composed (e.g . ,  
Croft 1 99 1 ;  Gawron 1 985 ;  Kaufmann 1 995b; though see Wunderl ich 1 997 a ,  1 997b, 
who proposes that contemporaneous events can also be composed) . As a conse­
quence, it is also frequently assumed that event composition results in the l inguistic 
event structure of a causative verb. Causative event structures are distinctive in 
that they are composed of two subevents, each of which can itself stand alone as a 
well-formed event structure, contrasting with simple event structures, which consist 
of only a single subevent. Surprisingly, there has been l ittle discussion of exactly 
what criteria make a causative, rather than a simple, event structure appropriate for 
compositionally derived events . 
In this paper, we present evidence from the syntax of nonlexical ly entai led 
result XPs in English that although many instances of event composition yield a 
causative event structure, in other instances a simple event structure is  more appro­
priate. We show that in those instances where a simple event structure is preferable, 
the semantic relation between the components of the compositionally derived event 
is tighter than the relation which holds between the components of a causative event 
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structure. We suggest that in the first case the two composed events meet conditions 
on event identity discussed in the philosophy and linguistics l iteratures, and we pro­
pose that when these conditions are met the two events are, in our terms, COIDEN­
TIFlED, giving rise to the simple event structure. We discuss the nature of event 
coidentification and suggest that event coidentification takes place due to Gricean 
considerations. 
1 .  Nonlexically Entailed Result XPs in English 
English allows XPs denoting nonlexically entailed results to be added to verbs, 
giving rise to what is usually referred to as the resultative construction .  Several 
types of resultative constructions are illustrated in (2)-(4) ; another is introduced in 
section 2.2 .  In each example in (2)-(4) there is an NP and an XP following the 
verb; the XP is predicated of the NP and specifies the result state of the NP as a 
consequence of the event described by the verb. 
(2) a. Kelly wiped the table clean.  
b. The mother rocked the baby to sleep. 
c .  The blacksmith hammered the metal flat. 
(3) a. Sam coughed himself into a haemorrhage. 
b. They yelled themselves hoarse. 
c .  He'd rock and chant himself into a trance. 
(4) a. The joggers ran the pavement flat .  
b. He sang us all to sleep. 
c. The dog barked the neighbor awake. 
The resultatives in (2) are based on transitive verbs and the postverbal NP is subcat­
egorized by the verb. For example, in (2a) Kelly wipes the table with the result that 
the table is clean.  The other two sets of examples illustrate resultatives based on 
intransitive verbs; in (3) the verb is followed by a reflexive pronoun and in (4) by a 
nonreflexive NP. In neither set is  the postverbal NP selected by the verb ; that is ,  cor­
responding to (3a) there is no sentence *Sam coughed himself and corresponding to 
(4a) there is no sentence *The joggers ran the pavement. The postverbal NP, then, 
must be licensed by the result XP. We refer to the resultatives illustrated in (3) as 
reflexive resultatives, and those in (4) as nonsubcategorized NP resultatives . In the 
reflexive resultatives, the use of a reflexive pronoun which is coreferential with the 
verb 's subject al lows the result XP to be understood as predicated of the subject. 
In fact, since this reflexive pronoun appears not to have an independent semantic 
function it has sometimes been referred to as a "fake" reflexive (Simpson 1 983) .  
Resultatives are often analyzed as describing single but complex events, 
typically causatives, consisting of a causing subevent and a result subevent brought 
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about by the causing subevent (Carrier and Randall 1 993 ; lackendoff 1 990; Kauf­
mann and Wunderlich 1 998;  Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1 998 ;  Van Valin 1 990; 
among others) .  The causing subevent is expressed by the verb, and the state or loca­
tion that results from the event described by the verb is expressed by the added XP. 
There have been a variety of motivations discussed for considering resultatives to 
be causatives (see, for example, Carrier and Randall 1 993 ; Dowty 1 979; Goldberg 
1 995 ; lackendoff 1 990; McCawley 1 97 1 ) ; most obvious among them is the fact 
that resultatives can easily be given a causative paraphrase. Thus,  They yelled them­
selves hoarse can be paraphrased as Their yelling caused them to become hoarse. 
In this paper, we focus on the event structures associated with resultatives 
based on intransitive verbs, and, in particular, on the event structures associated 
with the reflexive resultative pattern and another pattern, the bare XP pattern to be 
introduced in section 2.2. We limit ourselves to these two types of resultatives be­
cause the contrasts between them can be effectively exploited in an investigation 
of the nature of compositionally derived events ; however, the results described for 
these types of resultatives can be extended to all resultatives, including nonsubcate­
gorized NP resultatives and resultatives based on transitive verbs. We briefly return 
to nonsubcategorized NP resultatives in note 6 and transitive verb-based resultatives 
in section 2 .3 ;  see also Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1 999 for more discussion. 
We now turn to an investigation of the appropriate event structures for the 
two types of intransitive verb-based resultatives that are the focus of our study. 
Our arguments for their event structures draw on the results of research on the 
mapping from event structure to syntax which show that the syntax of resultative 
constructions can be used to argue for their associated event structure . 
2. Complex and Simple Event Structures 
We begin this section by introducing an argument for assigning a causative event 
structure to reflexive resultatives that has not been discussed previously in the liter­
ature. We show that a causative event structure for such resultatives can provide an 
explanation for the appearance of the "fake" reflexive following intransitive verbs 
in these resultatives . In section 2.2 we show that the lack of a reflexive pronoun in 
yet another type of intransitive verb-based resultative-bare XP resultatives-can be 
used to argue against a causative event analysis of this second type of resultatives . 
In this section we also present independent evidence that supports our proposal that 
a causative event analysis is not appropriate for bare XP resultatives . In section 2.3 
we show the semantic basis for the distinction between those resultatives which are 
associated with a causative event structure and those which are associated with a 
simple event structure, showing that the temporal relation between the subevents in 
the two cases is different. As we show in section 2.4, this temporal relation provides 
further justification for the causative analysis of reflexive resultatives since the con­
straints on the relation between the subevents in reflexive resultatives are identical 
to the constraints on the relations between the subevents of well-establ ished lexical 
causatives . 
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2 . 1 .  Argument Realization Reflects Event Complexity 
Events can be characterized according to whether their  l inguistic representations 
are complex, consisting of two subevents, each of which can stand alone as a 
well-formed event structure, or simple, consisting of a single subevent. The rep­
resentations in (5) are taken from Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1 998, but the com­
plex/simple event dichotomy is evident in other proposed event structure represen­
tations which may differ from these in various respects (e.g . ,  Parsons 1 990; Puste­
jovsky 1 99 1 ,  1 995 ; Van Valin and LaPolla 1 997) .2 
(5 ) a. [ x ACT < MA NNER> ] 
b. [ [ x ACT ] CAUSE [ BECOME [ Y <STATE> ] ] ] 
The representation in (5a) is a simple event structure for an activity, but states 
and changes of state also have simple event structures. The representation in (5b) 
is the bipartite representation associated with complex causative events, with two 
subevents ; we take all complex events to be causatives, and we will use the terms 
complex event structure and causative event structure interchangeably. 
Recently several researchers have suggested that the complexity of event 
structure is reflected in the argument real ization options for complex and simple 
events (e.g . ,  Grimshaw and Vikner 1 993 ;  van Hout 1 996; Kaufmann and Wunder­
l ich 1 998 ;  Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1 998) .  In particular, one effect of the well­
formedness conditions on the mapping from event structure to syntax introduced in 
Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1 998 is that there must be at least one distinct argument 
XP expressed in the syntax per subevent in the event structure, what we cal l  here 
the Argument-Per-Subevent Condition.3  As a consequence, argument realization 
patterns reflect the complexity of the events being described, so that verbs in sen­
tences expressing causative events must have at least two arguments and, thus, are 
obl igatori ly transitive. Rappaport Hovav and Levin ( 1 998) show that this assump­
tion explains a range of differences in the argument expression options available 
to verbs of surface contact and motion (e.g . ,  wipe, rub, scrub, sweep), which are 
chosen to represent verbs with simple event structures, and lexically simple exter­
nally caused verbs of change of state (e.g . ,  break, dry, open), which are chosen to 
represent verbs with complex even� structures. 
The examples in (6) show that verbs of surface contact and motion can ap­
pear without overt direct objects in nongeneric, nonhabitual contexts, while verbs 
of change of state cannot. 
(6) a. Leslie swept (the floor) . 
b. * Kelly broke again tonight when she did the dishes. 
Rappaport Hovav and Levin explain this difference by arguing that verbs of surface 
contact and motion, as activity verbs, are associated with a simple event structure, 
even though they describe events with two participants (an agent and a surface) . 
Due to their simple event structure, one of their arguments may be left unexpressed 
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without violating the Argument-Per-Subevent Condition; whether the argument ac­
tually can be left unexpressed depends on whether the pragmatic conditions neces­
sary for the interpretation of an unexpressed object are satisfied. It is the interaction 
of the Argument-Per-Subevent Condition and these pragmatic conditions that give 
rise to the "unspecified object" interpretation associated with the intransitive use 
of verbs of surface contact and motion. In contrast, external ly caused verbs of 
change of state, as causatives, are associated with a complex event structure with 
two subevents and must express both their arguments in order for the Argument­
Per-Subevent Condition to be satisfied. Thus, these verbs do not permit intransitive 
uses with an unspecified object interpretation.4 
The data in (7) shows that verbs of surface contact and motion can appear 
in sentences with a complex event structure, where the event described by the verb 
brings about the achievement of the state described by the added XP, but that verbs 
of change of state cannot. 
(7) a. The child rubbed the tiredness out of his eyes. 
Cinderel la scrubbed her hands raw. 
b. * The clumsy child broke the beauty out of the vase. 
* The clumsy child broke his knuckles raw. 
What is striking about the examples in (7) is that the direct object does not corre­
spond to the second argument of the verb, but rather to a newly introduced argument 
which is the "subject" of the achieved state expressed by the introduced XP. This op­
tion is allowed for verbs of surface contact and motion, but not for externally caused 
verbs of change of state, since the former, as activity verbs, satisfy the Argument­
Per-Subevent condition even when only one of their arguments is expressed, while 
verbs of change of state must express both their arguments to meet this condition . 
Thus, other than "normal" objects are permitted with verbs of surface contact and 
motion, but the choice of object is fixed for verbs of change of state. 
The hypothesis that a complex event structure must be associated with two 
argument XPs in the syntax, one for each subevent, has consequences for argument 
expression in resultatives . If reflexive resultatives based on intransitive verbs have a 
complex event structure, then by the Argument-Per-Subevent Condition they must 
include an object in order for the second subevent in this  event structure to have an 
associated argument XP. That is, if the event structure associated with the reflexive 
resultative (8) is complex, then there must be distinct argument XPs in the syntax 
for each of the subevents in the event structure: one for the subevent represented by 
the verb and one for the subevent represented by the XP. 
(8) Terry yelled himself hoarse . . .  (M. Maron, Southern Discomfort, The Mys-
terious Press, New York, 1 993,  p. 66) 
In fact, there are two distinct argument XPs in (8) ;  however, the argument XP which 
represents the participant in the result subevent is expressed as a reflexive because 
it has the same referent as the subject argument XP. Although the reflexive has the 
same referent as the subject, it cannot be omitted as it is required by the Argument­
Per-Subevent Condition (*Terry yelled hoarse) .  Thus, the label "fake" that has 
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been applied to the reflexive on the assumption that it i s  a syntactic placeholder is  a 
misnomer. 
2 .2 .  The Bare XP Resultative Pattern: The Case for a Simple Event Structure 
A reflexive pronoun is not always required when a result XP is combined with an 
intransitive verb to form a compositionally derived event. Intransitive verbs are 
found in another resultative pattern, illustrated in (9), where result XPs are pred­
icated directly of their subjects without the mediation of reflexives .  Due to this  
salient characteristic, we call this resultative pattern the bare XP pattern . 
(9) a. . . .  the cookies . . .  had burned black . . .  (P. Orenstein, "Almost Equal ," 
The New York Times Magazine, April 5 ,  1 998,  p .  48) 
b. This time the curtain rolled open on the court of the Caesars . . .  
(Olivia, Olivia, Hogarth Press, London, 1 949, p .  35) 
c .  I . . .  sloshed through the rain to the magazine's office in Kendall 
Square. (S. Kelly, Out of the Darkness, Villard, New York, 1 992, p .  
4) 
d. Sitting with our damp outer clothes steaming dry on the radiators . . .  
(N. Edwards, Mud, The Women 's Press, London, 1 986,  p .  38 )  
e .  If kettle is  allowed to boil  dry, damage may occur to porcelainized 
coating. (brochure included with Copco Tea Kettle) 
f. The branding iron burned into the calf's skin .  (Croft 1 99 1 : 1 6 1 ,  (25» 
If the presence of the reflexive can be taken to support the causative event structure 
associated with the reflexive pattern, then the absence of the reflexive in the bare XP 
pattern can be taken as evidence that such resultatives are associated with a simple 
event structure rather than a causative event structure with two subevents . Only in 
this way would the absence of the reflexive be allowed. 
The bare XP pattern has not received the same attention as the other resulta­
tive patterns, nor has it received a consistent analysis. In fact, some researchers have 
even denied that this pattern represents a SUbtype of the resultative construction.s 
Kaufmann ( 1 995a), Pustejovsky ( 1 99 1 ) , and Rapoport ( 1 998), among others, have 
argued that what we label bare XP resultatives are semantically distinguished from 
other resultatives in that their result XPs denote the endpoints of changes of state 
that are already lexicalized in their verbs .  That i&, they cite examples such as those 
in ( 1 0) ,  pointing out that bursting necessarily entails opening and freezing neces­
sarily entails becoming solid. 
( 1 0) a. 
b. 
The bag burst open . 
The pond froze sol id. 
Although this observation may be true of these examples and possibly also of (9a) ,  
it certainly does not hold of most of the examples in (9), which contain nonlexically 
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entailed result XPs . For example, the verbs roll, slosh, and steam in (9b )-(9d), are 
atelic and do not lexically entai l a result state. In (ge), the verb boil is used in the 
sense 'be in the state of boil ing' , rather than the sense 'come to boil ' .  This sense 
is atelic, as evidenced by the acceptabil ity of a durative adverbial in The kettle 
boiledfor five minutes, and does not entai l that a state of dryness wil l  come about.  
Finally, although (9f) describes a change of location, the verb burn, whatever its 
basic aspectual properties, does not entail a change of location.  Thus, these bare 
XP resultatives are instances of what we term event composition. 
Nevertheless, certain bare XP resultatives have sometimes been given a 
causative analysis, associating them with the same complex event structure as re­
flexive resultatives . In particular, causative analyses have been proposed for those 
bare XP resultatives which involve verbs of manner of motion in combination with 
a PP describing the goal of motion and date back at least to Kenny ( 1 963 :  1 77), 
who writes "walking to Rome is bringing it about that I am in Rome." More re­
cently, Croft ( 1 99 1 :  1 60) explicitly suggests that there is a causal relation between 
the subevents of such resultatives, offering the paraphrase ' the activity of sail ing 
causes the motion to come about' for The boat sailed into the cave, while Van Valin 
( 1 990:224, (3d)) provides the causative representation in ( 1 1 )  for Susan ran to the 
house. 
( 1 1 )  [run/ (Susan)] CAUSE [BECOME be-at/ Chouse, Susan)] 
As Kenny 's and Croft's paraphrases suggest, it is possible to isolate a causing event 
and a result event in certain bare XP resultatives . The availabi lity of such para­
phrases may perhaps explain why such bare XP resultatives are sometimes given a 
causative analysis and, hence, a complex event structure. This  proposal may also 
have its origins in the observation that many bare XP resultatives share certain as­
pectual properties-in particular, their durativeness and telicity-with prototypical 
accomplishments, such as Kim built the tree house. In his book Word Meaning and 
Montague Grammar, Dowty ( 1 979) entertains the possibil ity that the class  of ac­
complishments can be equated with the class of causatives, and indeed he makes 
a preliminary suggestion to this effect in Chapter 2 of his book (p. 9 1 ) . But his 
revised aspectual classification in Chapter 3 ,  which derives the temporal properties 
of the various classes from his interval semantics, does not give a uniform represen­
tation to all accomplishments, and the predicate CAUSE is no longer used to capture 
temporal properties . Nevertheless,  there has been a tendency to equate accomplish­
ments with causatives in subsequent studies, such as those cited above. Recently, 
however, Van Valin and LaPolla ( 1 997: 1 0  1 )  have argued that those instances of the 
bare XP pattern that take the form of a verb of manner of motion plus a goal phrase 
should not be given a causative analysis, and as mentioned here, the absence of the 
reflexive in this pattern-which supports a simple event structure analysis--can be 
taken as further evidence in support of their position. 
We now briefly review additional reasons for believing that a complex event 
structure is not appropriate for the bare XP pattern, but rather a simple event struc­
ture analysis is preferable, even for those instances of the pattern with nonlexically 
entailed result XPs . First, as already mentioned, bare XP resultatives such as those 
205 
206 Levin and Rappaport Hovav 
in ( 1 0) show no evidence of event composition, consisting simply of a single event, 
since their result XP specifies or modifies the endpoint of a scale already lexical­
ized in the verb and does not introduce a nonlexically entailed result. In fact, such 
bare XP resultatives cannot be given paraphrases that make expl icit reference to 
two events (cf. Parsons 1 990), as i l lustrated in ( 1 2) .  
( 1 2) a .  
b. 
The pond froze sol id. =1= 'The pond got sol id/solidified by freezing.' 
The bottle broke open. =1= 'The bottle opened by breaking.' 
In contrast, bare XP resultatives that clearly involve event composition, as evi­
denced by the fact that they involve nonlexically entai led results, allow such para­
phrases. For example, the bare XP resultatives in ( 1 3) allow the paraphrases in 
( 1 4). In these paraphrases the by-phrases appear to make direct reference to entities 
which can only be classified as events . Thus, these paraphrases, then, can be said 
to make explicit reference to two events . 
( 1 3) a. Casey waltzed out of the room. 
b. The clothes steamed dry. 
( 1 4) a. Casey went out of the room by waltzing. 
b. The clothes became dry by steaming. 
Taking the uniform syntactic structure of bare XP resultatives with and without 
nonlexically entailed result XPs together with the principles of event structure-to­
syntax mapping elaborated in section 2. 1 ,  it seems reasonable to assume that both 
SUbtypes of bare XP resultatives are associated with the same, simple event struc­
ture . The challenge for us will be to reconcile the idea that these instances involve 
event composition with the idea that they involve a simple event structure. 
Second, the relation between the subevents in  bare XP resultatives is less 
uniform than in reflexive resultatives. In bare XP resultatives the verb does not con­
sistently express the cause, nor the XP the result. In contrast, in reflexive resultatives 
(and also transitive verb-based resultatives and nonsubcategorized NP resultatives), 
the verb uniformly represents the causing event and the result XP represents the re­
sult event. Thus, in Kelly yelled herself hoarse, the yelling is the causing event and 
the becoming hoarse is the result event. Although many bare XP resultatives follow 
this pattern, it does not readily extend to most bare XP resultatives based on verbs 
of sound emission with goal result XPs . Contrast the bare XP resultative headed by 
a verb of manner of motion and the one headed by a verb of sound in ( 1 5) .  
( 1 5) a. Terry ran into the room. 
b. Terry rustled into the room. 
In ( 1 5a) the running causes the movement into the room, so that the verb expresses 
the cause and the XP the result, as in reflexive resultatives. In ( I 5b), the movement 
into the room causes the rustl ing-the emission of the sound denoted by the verb­
so it is the XP that expresses the cause and the verb that expresses the result, as 
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also noted by Goldberg ( 1 995) .  Thus, in the bare XP pattern there is no consistent 
correspondence of cause and result with verb and XP. We suggest that this lack 
of uniformity supports a simple event structure for bare XP resultatives. If two 
subevents are not represented in the event structures of such resultatives, then there 
may be no reason that particular meaning components need to be associated with 
particular lexical items as long as the appropriate set of meaning components is 
associated with the event as a whole. In contrast, a complex event structure with 
two distinct subevents, each with a fixed meaning and expression, would not be able 
to show thi s  flexibil ity. 
Based on these pieces of evidence, we propose that a simple event structure 
analysis is val id for all bare XP resultatives, even those including a result XP that 
is not lexically entailed by the verb. Two questions then arise. First, when does the 
addition of a nonlexically entailed result to an intransitive verb yield a simple event 
structure and when does it yield a complex event structure? Second, if bare XP 
resultatives involve event composition but not a complex event structure, then how 
does the simple event structure arise? We address the first question in section 2.3 by 
examining what differentiates the two types of resultatives. In section 3 we return 
to the second question-the question of what kind of event structure to assign to the 
bare XP pattern-building on our answer to the first question. 
2 . 3 .  The Distinct Temporal Structure of the Two Resultative Patterns 
We propose that the difference between the reflexive and bare XP resultatives has 
its root in a difference in the temporal relation between the constituent events . The 
temporal relation between the event described by the verb-the causing subevent­
and the achievement of the state/location described by the result XP-the result 
subevent-in the reflexive pattern is different from that in the bare XP pattern . 
In bare XP resultatives the temporal progress of the event described by the 
verb is necessari ly dependent on the temporal progress towards the achievement 
of the state described by the result XP; by this we mean that the subevents are 
temporal ly coextensive and unfold at the same rate. Thus,  the event described by the 
verb begins when the progress towards the result begins, and it necessarily extends 
until the result is achieved. In ( 1 6), for example, the dancing begins when Tracy 
starts across the ballroom and must continue until Tracy reaches the other side of 
the ballroom. 
( 1 6) Tracy waltzed to the other side of the ballroom. 
Adverbial modification can be used to demonstrate the temporal dependence 
of the subevents in bare XP resultatives .  A rate adverbial inserted into such a re­
sultative modifies both subevents . Thus, ( 1 7) entails  that the pony both went to 
the other side of the field slowly and trotted slowly. This  sentence cannot receive 
an interpretation where the progress across the field was slow, but the trotting was 
quick. 
( 1 7) The pony slowly trotted to the far side of the field. 
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Furthermore, ( 1 8) gives the impression of being a contradiction, as expected if the 
two subevents in the first clause, a bare XP resultative, are temporally dependent. 
( 1 8) Lewis ran quickly to the theater, but it took him a long time to get there since 
he took a circuitous route. 
If the two subevents were temporal ly independent, it should be possible for the ad­
verbial quickly to modify only one of the subevents, say the running, allowing for 
a second temporal phrase to independently specify information about the amount 
of time it takes to reach the destination (a long time), as ( 1 8) does. However, the 
observation that this sentence is contradictory shows that the adverbial applies to 
both the running and the going to the theater-they are understood to be both si­
multaneous and quick-and this is  incompatible with the temporal extent phrase (a 
long time), which specifies that the process of getting to the theater was nevertheless 
extended in time. This observation is reinforced, when ( 1 8) is contrasted with ( 1 9) ,  
which is not understood to be a contradiction, presumably because the two events, 
that of running and that of getting to the theater, are encoded in different clauses, 
and hence are not constrained to be temporally dependent. 
( 1 9) Lewis ran quickly, but it took him a long time to get to the theater since he 
took a circuitous route. 
Aspectual considerations provide further evidence for the temporal depen­
dence of the subevents in the bare XP pattern . In this  pattern, the lexical aspect 
of the verb is reflected in the interpretation of the result XP and thus determines 
the lexical aspect of the sentence as a whole. This interdependence is expected if 
both subevents comprising the event as a whole unfold together. Consider the pair 
of sentences in (20), which both involve the same XP, but differ in their verbs. In 
(20a), where the verbs are durative, the achievement of the result state is protracted, 
and the event as a whole has duration, but in (20b), where the verbs are punctual , 
the achievement of the result state must be close to punctual and so is  the event as 
a whole. Closing an aperture can be done quickly or slowly, and the different rate 
at which it happens in these sentences reflects the lexical aspect of the verb. 
(20) a. The gate (slowly) creaked/rumbled shut. 
b. The trapdoor (*slowly) banged/thudded shut. 
In contrast, in reflexive resultatives the temporal progress of the event de­
scribed by the verb need not be dependent on the temporal progress towards the 
achievement of the state described by the result XP. The subevents need not be 
temporally coextensive, nor need they unfold at the same rate. These properties 
are il lustrated in (2 1 ), which clearly describes an event where the result state is 
achieved after the conclusion of the causing event.6 
(2 1 )  Robin danced energetically during the party Sunday night. When she woke 
up stiff on Monday, she said: "I guess I 've danced myself stiff." 
Two STRUCTURES FOR COMPOSmONALLY DERIVED EVENTS 
In such resultatives,  even when the subevents are coextensive, this is accidental . 
Thus, it is possible that in  Robin danced herself stiff the getting stiff happens to 
begin when the dancing starts and happens to culminate when the dancing ends, but 
the two events do not have to unfold together, as (2 1 )  shows.  It appears that the 
nature of the event named by the verb and the nature of the result named by the XP 
jointly determine whether the two events must inherently be coextensive and do not 
just happen to allow accidental coextensiveness .  
Additional evidence that the subevents in reflexive resultatives need not be 
temporally dependent comes once again from adverbial modification.  In contrast 
with bare XP resultatives, adverbials need not modify both subevents in reflexive 
resultatives. Thus, (22) entails that Peter quickly developed an inferiority complex, 
but it need not entail that he read quickly, as brought out by the fel icity of a contin­
uation that expl icitly states the reading was slow, as shown in (23) .  
(22) Peter quickly read himself into an inferiority complex . 
(23) Peter quickly read himself into an inferiority complex, after a few slow de­
l iberate readings of his classmates ' theses. 
Furthermore, in reflexive resultatives the lexical aspect of verb is  not necessarily 
reflected in the aspect of the event introduced by the result XP. Thus, although the 
verb cough is a semelfactive and can be used punctually, the use of the matrix verb 
wait in (24) explicitly asserts that the event described by the reflexive resultative 
has duration, precluding a reading where there is a single cough and forcing an 
interpretation where there is an iterated series of coughs. Nevertheless, this  example 
is certainly compatible with a reading in which, following a series of coughs, the car 
came to life with a sudden start, so the achievement of the result state is  nevertheless 
punctual . Thus, the temporal contours of the event introduced by the verb and of 
the result subevent need not be the same. 
(24) . . .  I waited for the Jetta to cough itself awake. (V. Wilson Wesley, No Hiding 
Place, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1 997, p. 1 7 1 )  
As we show in more detai l in Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1 999, the key role 
of temporal dependence in the analysis of resultatives based on intransitive verbs 
is reinforced by an examination of resultatives based on transitive verbs .  Such re­
sultatives can also be classified according to whether they involve subevents that 
are necessarily temporal ly dependent, as in The lifeguard pulled the man out of the 
water, or subevents that need not be temporal ly dependent, as in The critics panned 
the play right out of town. Furthermore, the verbs that head transitive resultatives 
with temporal ly dependent subevents-verbs of exerting force such as pull, tug or 
yank-have an additional noteworthy property. They are not found in the double 
object construction (*The lifeguard pulled the mother the baby), although seman­
tically close verbs are. This restriction has been attributed by Pesetsky ( 1 995) and 
Pinker ( 1 989) to the fact that these verbs describe the simultaneous displacement of 
a physical object and exertion of force on this object-another way of describing 
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temporally dependent subevents . Thus, temporal dependence figures in the charac­
terization of l inguistic phenomena other than the resultative construction. 
As mentioned above, the inherent nature of the relation between the event 
described by the verb and the event of achieving the state described by the result XP 
determines whether or not the two events are necessarily temporal ly dependent. Al­
though we have not yet been able to formulate an explicit characterization of what 
makes this relation between two events hold, it i s  clear that certain pairs of events 
must show this dependence. For example, when a particular manner of motion is 
the means of traversing a path as in The boat sailed into the cave or Robin danced 
out of the room, the movement and the traversal of the path are necessari ly tempo­
ral ly dependent since as the motion continues the path is traversed. Nevertheless, 
it is possible that certain pairs of events might be construable as either temporally 
dependent or temporally independent; if so, we predict that the different constru­
als would have distinct syntactic encodings determined by the relation between the 
subevents . This prediction is real ized, as demonstrated by the minimal pairs in 
(25)-(26) . The members of each pair have the same verb-result XP combinations 
and thus involve the same subevents, but they differ as to whether they are bare XP 
resultatives, as in the (a) sentences, or reflexive resultatives, as in  the (b) sentences. 
(25) a. One woman gets up to leave, but Red-Eyes grabs her roughly by 
the arm and pulls her into his lap.  She wriggles free . . .  (F. O'Reilly, 
"Killing Time in the Shadow of War," The Ottawa Citizen, November 
30, 1 997, p. D I 0) 
b. "As he was entering the lift he was struck on the shoulder by the door 
and became stuck," Ms Romeril said. "Mr Duggan became alarmed 
about being caught in the door of a l ift which was about to begin 
its descent and wriggled himself free." ("Historian Settles Action on 
Lift Incident," The Irish Times, December 2, 1 994, p. 4) 
(26) a. On the way to the speedway, one of his race cars wiggled loose in­
side the transporter and caused damage to both of his  cars . (S .  Rose, 
"Robby Gordon Finds Problems Again at Track," The Kansas City 
Star, August 1 ,  1 997, p. D l l )  
b. "I had it [=the snake] pinned and when I l ifted it up into the bag, it 
wiggled itself loose and just sank its fangs on my knuckle" . . .  (M.E. 
Fernandez, "No Bark, But Big, Big Bite," The Washington Post, July 
1 1 , 1 998, p. C03) 
The members of each pair show a difference in meaning consistent with the ex­
pected difference in whether or not the subevents are necessarily temporally depen­
dent. (We return to comparable minimal pairs where this difference in construal 
may not be found in section 4.) In the scenario in (26a), which is expressed by a 
bare XP resultative, the restraints holding the car in place loosen l ittle by little from 
the continual wiggling of the car inside - the moving truck. The two events are co­
extensive and unfold together: as the wiggl ing continues, the loosening continues. 
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Thus, these events manifest the temporal dependence characteristic of a bare XP 
resultative. On the other hand in (26b), which uses a reflexive resultative, although 
the snake's wiggling and getting loose could proceed in tandem, it is more likely 
that the snake wiggles until suddenly the person holding the snake loosens his or 
her grip .  Thus, the events need not unfold together. In fact, when wiggl ing is  used 
to bring about a state that is not a necessary result of wiggling, so that the events 
cannot be necessarily temporally dependent, then a reflexive resultative is  required, 
as shown in (27) .  Getting comfortable is a matter of trial and error, and thus the 
achievement of this state cannot be temporally dependent on the wiggl ing. 
(27) a. I tried to wiggle myself comfortable in the passenger seat. (L. Barnes, 
Hardware, Delacorte, New York, 1 995, p .  35)  
b .  * I tried to  wiggle comfortable in the passenger seat. 
The minimal pairs in (25)-(26) pose a problem for many previous accounts 
of resultatives, which posit that the nature of the verb and the semantic type of the 
XP together determine the syntactic pattern of the resultative the verb-XP combi­
nation can be found in. These previous accounts (e.g . ,  Bresnan and Zaenen 1 990; 
Hoekstra 1 984, 1 988 ;  Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1 995) tie the syntax of the con­
struction to the classification of the verb as unaccusative or unergative, and the 
classification of a particular verb can sometimes vary according to the semantic 
type of the XP. The minimal pairs are problematic because they preserve the same 
verb-result XP combination while differing as to the presence or absence of a "fake" 
reflexive. See Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1 999 for further discussion. 
2.4. Further Support for the Causative Analysis of Reflexive Resultatives 
We have argued that reflexive resultatives should be assigned a causative event 
structure based on their pattern of argument expression. Most commonly, this event 
structure is associated with lexical causatives, that is ,  with verbs such as kill and 
transitive break or open whose meaning is paraphrasable using a notion of cause. If 
lexical causatives are associated with the same event structure as reflexive resulta­
tives, we would expect them to manifest the same temporal relation between their 
subevents as reflexive resultatives do, assuming that this  relation is a characteristic 
of a causative event structure. And indeed, the two subevents in a lexical causative 
are not necessari ly temporal ly dependent, as the following examples show. 
(28) a. Casey 's piano playing woke the baby. 
b. Terry shocked Sandy by deciding to run for office. 
c. The widow murdered the old man by putting poison in his soup. 
In (28a) the causing subevent, the piano playing, may go on for some time, but the 
result subevent, the baby 's awakening, may be punctual (though it need not be) .  
In  (28b), Terry ' s  decision to run for office could have occurred well before Sandy 
hears of it .  In (28c) the act of poisoning the soup must precede its ingestion by the 
victim and thus the victim's death . 
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In fact, lexical causatives and reflexive resultatives impose several additional 
but common constraints on the relationship between their subevents ; these are given 
in (29) .  
(29) a. The result subevent cannot begin before the causing subevent. 
b. The result subevent must bound the event as a whole. 
c. The result subevent would not have happened if the causing subevent 
had not happened and al l else had remained the same. 
d. There is no intervening event in the causal chain between the causing 
subevent and the result subevent. 
The first two constraints simply reflect the nature of what we have cal led causing 
and result subevents . We take the third constraint-the counterfactual relation be­
tween the subevents-to be the defining property of being a causative event, fol low­
ing the discussion in Dowty 1 979, who in turn draws on Lewis 1 973 .  We give the 
constraint in this form for simplicity, although ultimately it will need to be refined, 
most l ikely along the l ines laid out in Dowty 1 979 :  1 09 .  Studies of causatives have 
shown that the type of causation expressed in lexical causatives is what has been 
called direct causation (McCawley 1 978 ;  Pinker 1 989;  Shibatani 1 976b; among 
others), and Goldberg ( 1 995) also argues that resultatives involve direct causation . 
We propose that the constraint in (d) ensures that the relation between subevents 
is indeed a relation of direct causation . These shared constraints further support 
the assignment of the same event structure to both reflexive resultatives and lexical 
causatives. 
3. Bare XP Resultatives : An "Event Coidentification" Analysis 
We now return to the question of the appropriate event structure for those instances 
of the bare XP pattern with non lexical ly entailed results . The problem that needs 
to be resolved is that, as establi shed in section 2 .2 ,  the syntactic form of these bare 
XP resultatives suggests a simple event structure consisting of a single subevent, 
yet, as also argued in section 2.2, these resultatives appear to be derived through 
event composition . The compositionally derived nature of such resultatives receives 
support from the avai labi lity of paraphrases in ( 1 4) that made expl icit reference to 
two events . The question, then, is how a single subevent analysis of such bare XP 
resultatives can be reconciled with the view that they involve event composition? 
Events, as opposed to physical objects, are not individuated in  the world. 
What in the complex flow of happenings in the world can be considered an event 
is a matter of construal, reflected in the properties lexical ized in verbs. We can say 
that a verb lexicalizes a set of properties which are temporally anchored and that a 
happening in the world with this set of properties i s  considered to be an event. We 
suggest that bare XP resultatives are compositionally derived in that the happening 
in the world that they describe involves two temporally anchored sets of properties 
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which can each be lexicalized by a separate predicate; thus, this happening can po­
tentially be conceptual ized as involving two distinct events . Nonetheless, we argue 
that the relation between the constituent events-Le.,  the two temporally anchored 
sets of properties-is tight enough that the two sets of properties can be conceptual­
ized as being properties of a single event, allowing a simple event structure for bare 
XP resultatives. We say that bare XP resultatives are represented as simple events 
in event structure terms as a result of the COIDENTIFICATION of the constituent 
subevents . Our choice of the term "event coidentification" for the relationship that 
holds between events that are distinct in terms of conceptual structure-Le. ,  that 
can potentially be lexical ized separately-but that can be represented as a single 
simple event in event structure terms reflects the nature of this relationship. We ar­
gue that this relationship bears certain hallmarks of the notion "event identity," as it 
is discussed in the philosophy and l inguistics l iterature (Davidson 1 969; Lombard 
1 986; Parsons 1 990; among others) .  
Drawing on this l iterature, we isolate several conditions which we propose 
are required for event coidentitification; these are presented in (30) . 
(30) a. The subevents must have the same location and must necessarily be 
temporal ly dependent. 
b. One subevent must have a property that serves to measure out that 
subevent in time; this property is predicated of an entity that i s  nec­
essarily a participant in both subevents . 
The first condition incorporates an essential condition on event identity discussed in 
the philosophy and linguistics literature (Davidson 1 969; Parsons 1 990; among oth­
ers) :  events are spatiotemporally defined entities, and so to be identical , two events 
must have the same spatial and temporal properties . However, as noted in the l it­
erature on event identity, shared temporal extent alone is not sufficient for event 
identity. We propose that coidentified events must be temporally dependent, that is ,  
unfold at the same rate. We suggest condition (30b) as a way to ensure that tem­
poral dependence holds . There have been a number of interrelated approaches to 
the characterization of how events unfold in time (Dowty 1 99 1 ;  Hay, Kennedy, and 
Levin this volume, lackendoff 1 996; Krifka 1 989, 1 992; Ramchand 1 997;  Tenny 
1 987, 1 994; Verkuyl 1 993 ; among others) .  We build on this previous work, adopt­
ing the perspective in Hay, Kennedy, and Levin (this volume) that what is crucial to . 
characterizing the temporal unfolding of an event is the existence of property of a 
participant in the event which reflects the temporal progress of the event as a whole, 
recognizing that the nature of this property is  dependent on the type of event. For 
motion events, the property is the path of motion ; for change of state events, the 
property is a gradable property related to the state itself; for events of consumption 
and creation, the property is the spatial extent of the created or consumed object. 
In bare XP resultatives, the subevent introduced by the result XP is the event that 
has the associated property. Given the nature of such resultatives this property is 
predicated of a participant in both subevents, and we propose that it is by virtue of 
this shared participant that the subevents are temporally dependent. 
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We now consider an example. The bare XP resultative (3 1 )  portrays a hap­
pening in the world which involves the property of dancing and the property of 
traversing a path out of the room-the latter being a property that i s  not lexical ly 
entailed by the verb dance. 
(3 1 )  Robin danced out of the room 
These properties can be lexicalized by two distinct verbs and thus can potentially 
be conceptualized as involving two events, as in (32), where they are expressed in 
distinct clauses each headed by its own verb. 
(32) Robin went out of the room dancing. 
However, since the two events-Le. ,  the two temporal ly anchored sets of lexical­
ized properties-meet the conditions on event identity, their descriptions may be 
coidentified, and the happening is construed as a single event. That is, the proper­
ties of dancing and of traversing a path out of the room are considered properties 
of the same event. One possible formalization of what it  means for two events to 
be coidentified is that the two lexical heads which lexical ize the properties of the 
two events are predicated of the same event variable, as in the Parsons-style 1 990 
representation in (33) .  
(33) (3e) [Dancing(e) & Agent(e,Robin) & Go-Out(e) & Source(e,the room)] 
In contrast, reflexive resultatives portray happenings in the world that need 
not be temporal ly dependent and thus do not show the temporal properties needed 
for construal as a single event. For example, in the reflexive resultative (34a), the 
properties of Robin 's  becoming stiff and of Robin ' s  dancing cannot be considered 
properties of the same event since they do not meet conditions for event identity. 
They are at best only accidentally temporally coextensive and need not have the 
same temporal extent at al l .  Although there is a property in the result subevent (de­
gree of stiffness) predicated of the dancer which is a participant in both subevents, 
it appears that the result XPs in this and other reflexive resultatives do not neces­
sari ly pick up on properties that are relevant to the temporal unfolding of events of 
the type specified by the verbs in these reflexives. (See Wechsler 1 997 for similar 
ideas . )  Therefore, the dancing and the becoming stiff can be construed as one event 
only via a complex event structure comprised of two subevents . If the reflexive 
resultative in (34a) were given a Parsons-style event structure, it would have two 
distinct subevents, as in (34b) . 
(34) a. Robin danced herself stiff. 
b. (3e l )(3e2) [Dancing(e l )  & Agent(e l ,Robin) & Become-Stiff(e2) & 
Theme(e2,Robin) & Cause(e 1 ,e2)] 
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4. Why Event Coidentification Takes Place 
One additional question remains to be addressed: Why MUST event coidentification 
take place when the appropriate conditions are met? That is, why is it quite marginal 
to express a happening in which Robin danced and by dancing also went out of the 
room using the reflexive resultative pattern, as in (35)? 
(35) ?? Robin danced herself out of the room. 
The oddness of this example demands an explanation since the subevents, though 
temporally dependent, do meet the general constraints on the relations between the 
subevents of a causative event laid out in (29). That is ,  if the temporal ly anchored 
properties lexical ized by the two lexical heads are construed as being predicated of 
two distinct events, then the relation between these events meet the constraints in 
(29) . We suggest that such examples are not ungrammatical ; rather, pragmatic con­
siderations favor bare XP resultatives over reflexive resultatives as the expression 
of such happenings. The reason, we suggest, is that, all other things being equal , 
the preferred expression of a situation is the one that gives it the "tightest" event 
construal .  S ince a situation in which someone danced and thereby left the room can 
be construed as a single simple event, this construal is preferred to one in which the 
properties are factored out into two distinct subevents . Consequently, this  happen­
ing will be expressed using the bare XP pattern . More generally, we propose that 
events which can be coidentified must be, a requirement which we argue follows 
from Grice's ( 1 975) Maxim of Quantity, as we now explain .  (See Horn 1 996 and 
Krifka 1 989 for a discussion of similar phenomena along these l ines . )  
McCawley ( 1 978) proposes that pragmatic considerations can influence how 
a speaker chooses to express a particular situation, using causative situations as an 
example. As is well known, many languages have two formal means of expressing 
causative situations, typically known as lexical and periphrastic causatives; these 
are illustrated in (36).  
(36) a. Terry opened the door. (Lexical Causative) 
b. Terry caused the door to open . (Periphrastic Causative) 
Distinct meanings are attributed to the two types of causatives : lexical causatives 
are said to describe direct causation, while periphrastic causatives are said to de­
scribe indirect causation . McCawley argues that this characterization is not quite 
correct; rather lexical causatives necessarily express direct causation, while pe­
riphrastic causatives are neutral with respect to directness of causation. To support 
this proposal, McCawley shows that periphrastic causatives can, in fact, describe 
either direct or indirect causation, using the following example to make his point. 
Suppose that Black Bart shot the sheriff to death-a clear instance of direct causa­
tion . In this  context the question in (37) must be answered Yes, showing that direct 
causation comes under the scope of the periphrastic causative. 
(37) Did Black Bart cause the sheriff to die? Yes/*No, he shot him through the 
heart and the sheriff died instantly. (McCawley 1 978 :250, (6b)) 
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McCawley then argues that the typical restriction of periphrastic causatives to in­
direct causation follows from principles of conversational implicature. A speaker 
will use a lexical causative, if there is one available, to describe an instance of direct 
causation since by Grice's  ( 1 975) Maxim of Quantity this  is more informative than 
using a periphrastic causative. 
Similar considerations can be extended to the resultative construction .  We 
have argued that in the bare XP resultatives, two sets of temporal ly anchored prop­
erties are conflated into a single event description with only one subevent in the 
associated event structure. However, the relation between these two sets of prop­
erties meets the constraints laid out in (29) on the relation between the subevents 
of reflexive resultatives . The first two constraints, (a) and (b), clearly hold. Fur­
thermore, in (3 1 ) , Robin danced out of the room, there is a counterfactual relation 
between the properties of an event of dancing by Robin and the properties of an 
event of traversing the path out of the room by Robin (constraint c), since if Robin 
had not danced, she clearly would not have gotten out of the room, al l  other things 
being equal . This relation accounts for the causal flavor of this  example and others 
l ike it, and, perhaps, for why they are sometimes considered causatives (see section 
2.2). And since the dancing and the traversal of the path unfold together in (3 1 ) , 
there i s  clearly no other intervening event in the causal chain between these events, 
so causation is  direct (constraint d) . Finally, the temporal relation between the danc­
ing and the traversal of the path-that of temporal dependence-is really a special 
case of the temporal relation between the subevents in a causative event structure. 
As argued in section 2 .3 ,  bare XP resultatives must describe events with temporally 
dependent subevents, while reflexive resultatives are neutral as to the temporal de­
pendence of the subevents in the events they describe; as we put it, the events need 
not be temporally dependent. As a result, the situations which can be described by 
the bare xp resultatives are a subset of those which can be described by the reflex­
ive resultatives. The use of a bare XP resultative, then, is more informative than the 
use of the reflexive resultative. In this way the relation between bare XP resulta­
tives and reflexive resultatives resembles that between direct causatives and indirect 
causatives. Thus, a bare XP resultative should be preferred to a reflexive resultative 
in the expression of coidentified-i.e . ,  necessarily temporally dependent-events, 
all other things being equal . As a result, reflexive resultatives wil l  generally be 
restricted to the description of temporal ly independent events ; therefore, (35) is 
disfavored on pragmatic grounds. 
On this approach, then, whether or not two sets of properties are factored 
out and predicated of two distinct events or conflated to be predicated of a single 
event i s  in  some instances a matter of choice between alternative conceptualiza­
tions of an event. Pragmatic considerations determine which conceptual ization, 
and concomitantly which mode of expressing an event, is  preferred. Thus, reflexive 
resultatives could be used to describe two temporally dependent events when prag­
matic considerations disfavor the use of the bare XP resultative pattern . Consider 
one of the central uses of the bare XP pattern : to express motion in some manner 
towards a goal . The use of the reflexive resultative pattern to express such events 
would draw the hearer's attention to the component events . In fact, our collection of 
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natural ly-occurring resultatives includes at least two examples similar to the con­
structed example (35); the first one, (38a),  describes a pampered cat, the second, 
(38b), an ex-husband who drops in on his former wife. 
(38) a. Domina implied that her hunger was so debilitating that she could 
hardly crawl her sleek self across the kitchen floor. (J .R. Hulland, An 
Educated Murder, St. Martin 's ,  New York, 1 986, p .  1 56) 
b. Then, without another word, he withdrew from the kitchen and saun­
tered his Bermuda-shorted self through the front door. (D.M. David­
son, Killer Pancake, Bantam, New York, 1 995,  p. 63) 
Strictly speaking, these two examples are not instances of the reflexive pattern in  
that they have a modifier "inserted" into a reflexive pronoun rather than the reflexive 
pronoun characteristic of the reflexive resultative pattern ; thus, they could be said 
to represent a variant of the reflexive resultative pattern . 7 
We believe that this slight departure from the reflexive resultative pattern 
is significant. As has often been noted (e .g . ,  Croft 1 99 1 ;  Talmy 1 976), animate 
entities can be presented as intentional agents-their prototypical construal-or as 
physical ,  and thus manipulatable, objects . The examples in (38) exploit the two 
perspectives on the entity whose motion is being described: as an intentional agent 
in subject position and as a physical object in postverbal position . 8  The physical 
object construal is signaled by the use of a modifier describing physical appearance: 
sleek for the cat and Bermuda-shorted for the man. (That is ,  the modifiers could 
easily have referred to properties of an intentional agent, such as cunning for the 
cat or callous for the man, but they do not.) By choosing to use this variant on 
the reflexive resultative pattern to express these happenings rather than the bare XP 
pattern, the writers draw attention to the two conceptually distinct events that are 
being composed. Thus, they are able to convey that in (38a) there is substantial 
effort involved in the cat getting to the food and that in (38b) the protagonist is  
trying to create a certain effect by his exit. 
In the discussion of the minimal pairs involving verbs such as wiggle and 
wriggle in (25)-(26) in section 2 .3 ,  we mentioned that not all such pairs are ex­
plainable in terms of a difference in whether or not the subevents described are 
necessarily temporally dependent. In those instances where both members of the 
pairs arguably involve temporally dependent subevents, the choice between the two 
resultative patterns might reflect pragmatic considerations. For instance, such con­
siderations might i l luminate a minimal pair involving the verb kick, which resem­
bles the wiggle/wriggle minimal pairs in (25)-(26), but does not seem amenable to 
the account proposed for these pairs . 
(39) a. A bantam chick kicks free from its shell .  (Picture caption, Chicago 
Tribune, March 2 1 ,  1 996, p. 8)  
b. " . . .  They . . .  watched a duckling kick itself free of its shell . . .  " read 
a newspaper report of the outing. ("Pellatt Lost Estate Farm to Stock 
Crash," The Toronto Star, August 8, 1 99 1 ,  p. N4) 
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The pair in (39) cannot be explained in the same way as the wiggle/wriggle pairs­
that is, by appealing to differences in the situation being described-since the sen­
tences in (39) describe precisely the same situation: a chick hatching. Furthermore, 
this situation involves two inherently temporally dependent subevents : the chick's 
kicking and the chick's becoming free from its shell .  Since these subevents are po­
tentially coidentifiable, they should be expressed via the bare XP pattern, as they 
are in (39a) . We propose that the author chose the unexpected use of the reflexive 
resultative pattern in (39b) to draw the reader's attention to the larger point being 
made in this part of the article. This example is taken from a description of the 
new experiences of some "city girls"-a group of Girl Guides from Toronto-on a 
visit to a farm. By using the reflexive resultative pattern, the writer highlights the 
two distinct subevents involved, conveying that the girls are witnessing a chick's 
hatching for the first time. 
5. Conclusions and Consequences 
This paper uses resultative constructions based on intransitive verbs as a probe into 
the nature of compositionally derived events. We have shown that there are two 
ways of extending the basic meaning of a verb via event composition, resulting 
in two types of event structures : (i) a complex event structure consisting of two 
causally related subevents and (ii) a simple event structure formed from the com­
position of two necessarily temporal ly dependent "coidentified" events . S ignifi­
cantly, event composition does not always result in a causative event structure with 
two subevents. Only the first of the two types of event composition gives rise to 
a causative event structure, even though the counterfactual relation which defines 
causatives seems to hold between the "subevents" in bare XP resultatives, which 
we argue should nevertheless have a simple event structure. It seems natural lan­
guage prefers to reserve true complex event structures for the representation of sin­
gle events consisting of clearly distinct subevents, that is ,  subevents that do not meet 
the conditions on event coidentification. We have also argued that the two syntactic 
resultative patterns found with intransitive verbs are manifestations of the two event 
structures we have identified. Thus, the nature of a compositional ly derived event 
is reflected in the syntax, with complex event structures requiring two arguments in 
their syntactic realization, following the Argument-Per-Subevent Condition.9 
Endnotes 
* We have had various opportunities to present this material , and we thank the 
audiences for their helpful questions and comments . We are also grateful to all those 
who have discussed this work with us or commented on the larger, unpublished 
manuscript that much of the content of this paper is drawn from, especial ly Edit 
Doron, David Dowty, Chris Kennedy, Fred Landman, Susan Rothstein, and Steve 
Wechsler. This work was supported in part by NSF Grant SBR-96 1 6453 to Levin.  
Two STRUCTURES FOR COMPOSITIONALLY DERIVED EVENTS 
1 .  Throughout this paper, we take the term "event" to refer to a happening in the 
world which is described by a verb and its complements or by a l ight verb with a 
predicative complement (e .g . ,  become sick) and its complements . The term "event" 
is also used, however, to refer to the l inguistic entity which describes thi s  happen­
ing in the world, also called an event structure representation, to be introduced and 
il lustrated in section 2. 1 .  In discussing the notion of event composition, it is clear 
that we are not talking about composing the entities in the world, but rather form­
ing a complex event description via an operation on event structures. Despite the 
inaccuracy of this term, we will continue to talk about event composition . 
2 .  Although we label some of our event structures with traditional lexical aspectual 
labels, the difference between complex and simple events cannot be reduced to any 
recognized aspectual distinction . For example, a simple event structure can be telic 
(e .g . ,  achievements with a definite change of state such as arrive) or atelic (e.g . ,  
activities such as run and indefinite change of state verbs such as dim) ; complex 
events can be telic (e.g . ,  the resultatives under discussion) or atelic (e .g . ,  some lex­
ical causatives such as fly a kite). For more discussion see Van Valin  and LaPolla 
1 997 and Hay, Kennedy, and Levin this volume. Another point worth mentioning 
is that not al l researchers use the same criteria for assigning a complex event rep­
resentation . Pustejovsky ( 1 99 1 ,  1 995) and van Hout ( 1 996), for example, assign a 
complex event structure to all events which they consider transitions ;  for them the 
notion "cause" plays no part in the definition of complex events . Interestingly, they 
nevertheless do not assign distinct event structures to the two types of composition­
ally derived events that are the subject of this paper. A comparison of the various 
approaches is clearly in order. 
3 .  In Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1 998, this condition is not explicitly formulated, 
but rather its effects follow from the interaction of the inventory of possible event 
structures with a well-formedness condition on argument realization, the Structure 
Participant Condition . This condition requires that any participants explicitly re­
quired by the event structure be real ized in the syntax ; a simple event has one re­
quired participant, and a complex event has two. For ease of exposition we have 
formulated the Argument-Per-Subevent Condition here.  
4. Goldberg (to appear) correctly points out that verbs of change of state are some­
times found with understood, but unexpressed, objects. However, as Goldberg her­
self notes, the objects of such verbs are omitted only under special conditions: for 
instance, when these verbs are found in generic or habitual contexts . These contexts 
also l icense unexpressed objects for verbs of surface contact and motion and other 
transitive verbs having an event structure with a single subevent, and it may be that 
the omission of direct objects in these contexts represents a different phenomenon 
from the one discussed here, which is precluded for verbs of change of state. Thus, 
it appears that the differences which we take to characterize the two classes of verbs 
remain valid, thOl:lgh the additional type of unexpressed object requires further in­
vestigation and must be accommodated within our theory of argument realization. 
5. We are using the term "resultative construction" only for descriptive convenience 
and provide no explicit criteria for a sentence being an instance of this construction, 
so whether or not this pattern is considered a case of the resultative construction is 
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not important for us. As we mention below, our interest in these examples stems 
from the fact that in some of these cases they involve event composition. 
6 .  Nonsubcategorized NP resultatives show the same temporal relation between 
their subevents as reflexive resultatives:  the subevents need not be necessarily tem­
porally dependent. For example, in Leslie sneezed the tissue off the table, the tissue 
need not start moving until the sneeze is over. Given their syntactic form, these 
resultatives presumably have the same complex event structure as reflexive resulta­
tives, as suggested in Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1 999. 
7 .  Our collection of resultatives includes further examples of verbs of manner of 
motion followed by a reflexive and a directional phrase; however, some of these 
may be simple causatives with a reflexive object rather than reflexive resultatives. 
In limited circumstances, English allows causatives of manner of motion verbs, as 
in I marched the kids out of the room, which receives the interpretation 'I caused the 
kids to march out of the room' and not the "resultative" interpretation 'I marched 
and thereby caused the kids to go out of the room' .  Thus, sentences such as I 
marched myself into the Harvard Bookstore . . .  (S . Kelly, The Trail of the Dragon, 
Walker, New York, 1 988,  p.  88) must be evaluated carefully to determine whether 
they are causatives or reflexive resultatives . The sentence just cited would be para­
phrased as 'I caused myself to march into the bookstore ' on the causative analysis 
and as ' I  marched, thereby causing myself to go into the bookstore' on the reflexive 
resultative analysis .  The examples in (38) contain verbs which do not readily appear 
as causatives with nonreflexive objects ( *The cat crawled the kitten, *He sauntered 
his child) and are likely to be reflexive resultatives rather than causatives . 
8 .  The portrayal of an animate entity as a physical object is  clear in the following 
nonsubcategorized NP resultative based on the intransitive verb fly: ' . . .  It [=loveJ 
seized me in its talons and flew me up to the heavens . . .  ' (H. Hucker, Trials of 
Friendship, St. Martin's ,  New York, 1 998, p.  1 93) .  
9 .  As we discuss in Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1 999, the question of whether 
unaccusativity is syntactical ly encoded can be fruitfully reexamined in l ight of this  
study. The explanation of the contrast between reflexive and bare XP resultatives 
has been at the core of arguments for the syntactic encoding of unaccusativity in  
English (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1 995 ; Simpson 1 983 ;  among others). In  elu­
cidating the nature of compositionally derived events, we have presented a seman­
tic account of those facets of the resultative construction . Thus, our work further 
weakens the case for the syntactic encoding of unaccusativity in English, support­
ing previous arguments to this effect (e.g. ,  Dowty 1 99 1 ;  Kaufmann 1 995a, 1 995b; 
Napoli 1 988 ;  Van Valin 1 990; Wechsler 1 997). 
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